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Abstract: Traffic management, road safety, and 
environmental impact are important issues in the modern world. 
These challenges are addressed by the application of sensing, 
control and communication methods of intelligent 
transportation systems (ITS). A part of ITS is a vehicular ad-hoc 
network (VANET) which means a wireless network of vehicles. 
However, communication among vehicles in a VANET exposes 
several security threats which need to be studied and addressed. 
In this review, firstly, the basic flow of VANET is illustrated 
focusing on its communication methods, architecture, 
characteristics, standards, and security facilities. Next, the 
attacks and threats for VANET are discussed. Moreover, the 
authentication systems are described by which vehicular 
networks can be protected from fake messages and malicious 
nodes. Security threats and counter measures are discussed for 
different remote vehicle communication methods namely, 
remote keyless entry system, dedicated short range 
communication, cellular scheme, Zigbee, Bluetooth, radio 
frequency identification, WiFi, WiMAX, and different direct 
vehicle communication methods namely on-board diagnosis and 
universal serial bus.  
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I. Introduction 
Vehicular networking for intelligent transportation system 
(ITS) can be considered as an emerging technology. It has 
attracted the attention of industrialist, academia in USA, 
Japan, and Europe. The association of electric technology for 
automobile traffic and driving (Japan) popularly known as 
JSK established the idea of vehicular communication and 
networking in the early 1980s. The formal development 
process began in 1990s in USA. The vehicles used in modern 
times can no longer be appraised as just mechanical 
arrangements, including 100 million lines of code in the total 
architecture, more sophisticated than a modern operating 
system. One part of ITS is the vehicular ad-hoc network 
(VANET) which is a wireless network of vehicles. Within a 
VANET, a vehicle can communicate with other vehicles and 
with the traffic light or other road side infrastructure. These 
vehicles exchange important information for example, traffic 
condition, accident warning, curvature of the roads, etc. 
In a VANET, the main role is performed by vehicles which 
have computation facilities and can even connect to remote 
devices like smart phones. A smart vehicle can now provide 
different facilities such as safety information, weather and 
navigation information to the driver. A vehicle can also 
communicate with other nearby vehicles, traffic lights or other 
road side infrastructures. These facilities have brought a 
number of advantages to the occupants, but there is also the 
introduction of hackers to track the vehicle and create 
different forms of risks.  
The severity of cyber threats in vehicular communication 
system can be categorized into three ways:   
(i) High threats: On-board diagnostics (OBD) hack, V2V 
hack, V2I hack, GPS spoofing, MITM.   
(ii) Medium threats: key fob hacking, attack on control 
area network (CAN) bus, entertainment system hacking.  
(iii) Low threats: Airbags hacking, brakes hacking  
Figure 1 illustrates the common requirements needed to 
establish a highly secured vehicular communication system. 
 
 
Figure 1. Security Requirements 
Threats occurred in vehicular communications can be 
discussed by the autonomous vehicular 
sensing-communication-control (AutoVSCC) model. In 
sensing layer, eavesdropping or spoofing may occur on 
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vehicle sensors. In communication layer, inter-vehicular and 
intra-vehicular communication are included. In 
communication layer, eavesdropping may occur. Messages 
can be manipulated between cars and roadside infrastructure. 
Threats to the sensing layer and communication layer can 
affect the control layer. Speed of the cars and steering control 
can be hampered due to the threats of the control layer [1-3].  
Despite a number of research works, there are still many 
security challenges in vehicle communication systems. This 
paper provides a comprehensive review of the security threats 
and countermeasures for direct and remote vehicle 
communication. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II discusses different remote vehicle communication 
methods namely, remote keyless entry system, dedicated short 
range communication, cellular scheme, Zigbee, bluetooth, 
RFID, WiFi, and WiMAX. The security threats and 
countermeasures of these systems are also described in 
Section II. Section III presents the security issues and their 
remedies for direct vehicle communication methods namely 
OBD and USB. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided 
in Section IV. 
II. Remote Communication Technologies 
Remote communication systems can be used within 
vehicle-to-everything communication. With this 
communication, messages can be passed between onboard 
units and roadside units. Weak Points can be focused by 
attackers in the area of remote communication technologies 
for the purpose of tampering wickedly with a car’s or bus’s 
functioning from a suitable distance. Therefore, attackers 
need not connect external devices to vehicle ports for 
achieving entry to vehicle communication system 
architectures [4-6]. There are some limitations in remote 
communication technologies and attackers can detect the 
limitations. Figure 2 classifies the remote communication 
technology into several categories such as keyless entry 
system (RKE), wireless access in vehicular system, Zigbee, 
radio frequency identification (RFID), WiMAX, Wi-Fi, etc.    
 
Figure 2. Types of Remote Communication 
A. Remote Keyless Entry System  
Remote keyless entry system can also be called remote central 
locking. This system refers to an electronic remote controlled 
lock. This lock can be activated not only by a hand operated 
device but also by proximity. The lock is controlled by a 
keypad. The keypad is located at or near the driver's door. 
Ford and Lincoln car brand use this system.  
1) Threats  
There are a number of vehicle manufacturers that use 
cryptographic RKE keys. One example is the VW Group 
using rolling code schemes [7]. However, the rolling codes 
are vulnerable to eavesdrop attacks and RKE cloning. 
At the 2015 DEFCON hacker convention, it was shown that 
attackers could jam the signal to the RKE receiver and use a 
different receiver to store RKE codes [7]. Tewari et al. [8] 
provided an extensive listing of attacks to which RKE systems 
are vulnerable and notes that RKE systems’ three main 
vulnerabilities are their frequent use of outdated devices and 
techniques, weak cryptographic schemes, and implementation 
faults. Glocker et al. [9] also discussed the potential attacks on 
RKE systems, and Liu et al. [10] examined the vulnerabilities 
of and potential attacks on the Hitag2 cipher, which is used in 
many RKE systems.  
2)  Countermeasures  
S. Van De Beek et al. [11] designed a robust receiver. 
According to them, the receiver is less susceptible to jamming 
attacks. Hamadaqa et al. [12] described a Secret Unknown 
Cipher (SUC) methods that would allow RKE controllers to 
be cloneresistant. Garcia and Oswald [7] presented 
vulnerabilities in keyless entry methods. They illustrated 
Hitag2 rolling code structure. Hitag2 can be used in vehicles 
made by Alfa Romeo, Ford, Chevrolet, Peugeot, etc. Zhang et 
al. [13] presented effective k-Means Authentication 2 
(EKA2). EKA2 validates the revocation status of digital 
certificates with the help of clustering approach for 
authenticating RKE devices in order to communicate with the 
vehicle. Lee et al. [14] provided a Rhythm Key-based 
approach to encrypting RKE communications.  
B. DSRC  
Dedicated Short Range Communication is a type of wireless 
communication technology. The technology is 
802.11p-based. This communication provides robust security, 
direct communication with high amount of speed between 
vehicles such as buses, cars and the adjacent infrastructure. 
This system does not involve any cellular infrastructure. IEEE 
802.11p standard states enrichments of ITS related 
applications. Figure 3 shows a basic diagram of DSRC used in 
vehicular communication. In this figure, RSU denotes the 
road side unit and V2I means vehicle to infrastructure 
communication system.   
The operating frequency band of DSRC is 5.9 GHz. The FCC 
dedicated a bandwidth of 75 MHz for DSRC technology in the 
5.9 GHz band in 2004. WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular 
Environments) systems include OBUs and RSUs [15]. Y. Li 
[15] illustrated a summary of DSRC and WAVE. 
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Figure 3. DSRC System (Adapted from [73]) 
1)  Threats  
Laurendeau et. al. [16] identified some important threats such 
as malware, DoS, spamming, black hole, location tracking 
GPS spoofing, etc. These threats are barrier to the security of 
DSRC or WAVE based networks. They used ETSI’s threat 
methods for threat identification. They discussed probable 
solutions to the critical threats. According to them, DoS attack 
can be considered as major threats. S. C. Urgen [17, 18] 
proposed a simulation platform which supports both DSRC 
and Visible light communication in platoon. Urgen also 
analyzed the stability of platoon under false packet condition 
and duplication of security. Visible light Communication 
(VLC) a form of optical wireless communication [19] is 
susceptible to attacks owing to the use of antennas that are 
omnidirectional. The authors expanded that work in [20] and 
pushed for a fusion of VCL and DSRC protocol in order to 
mitigate jamming, packet injection or other attacks in platoon. 
W. Whyte [21] identifies the threats encountered by WAVE 
service system. They observed that wave service system is 
susceptible to not only availability threats but also privacy 
threats. Privacy threats occur from Eavesdropping attacks.  
2) Countermeasures  
N. Lyamin proposed a real-time detector that can clog 
Distributed of service (DoS) attacks in the VANET platoons 
[22]. Platooning scenario is shown in figure 4. The detector 
had been validated in terms of two condition within a time 
range. They are (i) detection and (ii) false alarm probabilities.  
 
Figure 4. Platooning Scenario  
Huong Nguyen-Minh et al. [23] proposed a detection method 
of distinguishing packet loss due to several reasons such as 
normal collisions and jamming attacks. They also described 
observation and estimation model. They described the impact 
of wrong estimation at the time of probability detection 
graphically. Their simulation results showed that when attack 
probability is high then detection probability is high and 
collisions condition is low.   
Nidhi Gambhir et. al. [24] proposed a novel network model 
with the generation of RSA public or private key pair in order 
to initiate connection in the VANET. Three common 
encryption techniques such as DES (Data encryption 
standard), AES (Advanced encryption standard) and RSA 
algorithm were discussed and their performance was 
compared with the proposed method in terms of computation 
time of encryption decryption process, buffer size in bytes, 
encryption and decryption throughput in Byte/second.  
Communication over IEEE 802.11p standard can be 
accomplished by their proposed hybrid technique.   
C. Cellular Technology  
DSRC has some limitations. The ability of DSRC to support 
reliable and efficient vehicle-to-vehicle communications is 
poor especially in high vehicle density situations. 
Additionally, the allocated DSRC radio spectrum is not 
estimated to meet the high data traffic demand for in-vehicle 
internet access. DSRC has short range. The network path in 
which the packets route to or from the gateway reduce the 
appropriateness of DSRC for any Vehicle-to-everything 
communication. For this case, DSRC requires low latency 
data dissemination on a large road segment. There is also 
limitation of DSRC based CSMA/CA technique, which is the 
main contention-based MAC scheme employed by DSRC 
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standards, such as IEEE 802.11. The currently used cellular 
technology in 4th generation (4G) is the Long-Term Evolution 
(LTE) and LTE-advanced. These systems enable high speed 
wireless cellular communication for a large number of mobile 
users with the use of orthogonal frequency division 
multiplexing (OFDM) [5, 19, 25-28], and its multiple access 
version known as OFDMA. The next generation of cellular 
systems 5G and 6G are expected to use derivatives of OFDM 
[27] in order to enable even higher data rates for more users 
than 4G. 
Pure-DSRC vehicle to everything (V2X) communication is 
gaining popularity with the amalgamation of cellular 
technologies for various applications. Figure 5 shows a 
scenario of V2X communication system. Several reasons 
exist for this interest:   
a) High network capacity with high bandwidth  
b) Wide cellular coverage range,  
c) Mature technology, which eases the implementation and 
accelerates the deployment of V2X communications.   
In spite of having these benefits, there are also many barriers. 
The barriers can limit the ability of cellular technology to 
support reliable V2X communications.   
 
Figure 5. V2X communications 
Cellular V2X (C-V2X) has been developed by 3GPP1. This 
technology has two different modes [29]. One is the device to 
device mode which includes vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), 
vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) and vehicle-to-roadway 
infrastructure (V2I). In this mode, there is direct 
communication and thus scheduling is not required for 
networking. The second mode is the device-to network or 
vehicle-to-network (V2N) mode. This mode enables a number 
of cloud services with the use of cellular communication. 
1) Threats  
Jin Cao et al. [30] made a number of contributions to the 
security characteristics of the LTE and LTE-Advanced 
networks. They presented a summary of the security 
functionality of the LTE and LTE-Advanced networks with 
the exploration of the security weaknesses existing in the 
architecture of the LTE and LTE-Advanced networks.   
There are some security risks in LTE networks such as the 
vulnerability to the injection, modification, eavesdropping 
attacks [31]. So, it has more privacy risks than GSM and 
UMTS [32].  
Ravishankar Borgaonkar proposed a new privacy attack 
against the variants of the authentication and key management 
(AKA) protocol. Their proposed attack breaches the privacy 
of the subscribers’ more rigorously than the common attacks 
do. They show that moderately learning SQN leads to activity 
monitoring attacks [33]. LTE network suffers from various 
attacks such as spoofing the IP address, DoS attacks, worms, 
viruses, etc. [32]. Since LTE femto cell is launched, HeNBs 
(Home enodeB) are attained by the attacker. The attackers can 
modify the functionality of the cell according to his own 
requirements [34].  
David Rupprecht et al. [35] focused on two types of security 
characteristics:  
(a) Encrypting user data.  
(b) Authentication of the network.   
A framework was developed in [35] for analyzing different 
LTE devices. They show some important characteristics after 
analyzing the device. They are:  
i) An LTE network can impose on using no encryption   
ii) None of the tested devices informs the user about 
unencrypted message.   
iii) MITM attack against an LTE device that does not 
fulfill the network authentication requirements.  
2) Countermeasures  
Liyange et al. [36] suggested LTE security features. 
According to the study [36], software defined networking and 
network function virtualization concepts can improve the 
security of LTE. J. Cichonski et al. [37] provided some 
solutions in order to mitigate the LTE security threats. The 
study illustrated the use of ciphering indicator that is defined 
in 3GPP TS 22.101. This indicator informs the status of the 
user plane confidentiality protection. They also discussed the 
planning of configuration management, patch management, 
malware and intrusion detection and implementation 
throughout the mobile network operator’s infrastructure for 
the purpose of alleviating malware attacks impacting radio 
access network and core infrastructure, unauthorized 
operation and access management networks.  
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Figure 6. Network Architecture of LTE 
 
D. Zigbee  
Zigbee is a wireless standards-based technology for WSN 
applications in order to address the needs of low-cost, long 
battery life. Zigbee operates on the IEEE 802.15.4 physical 
radio specification. It has three operating frequency bands 
such as 868 MHz, 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz. ZigBee allows 
mesh networking facility. With this wireless mesh networking 
facility, ZigBee is applied by routers and receivers in multiple 
application scenarios [38]. The spread spectrum technique 
used in Zigbee is direct-sequence spread spectrum. 
Modulation technique adopted in Zigbee is offset-QPSK. 
Channel width is 2 MHz and channel spacing is 5 MHz. Yu 
Lei and Jian Wu [39] applied Zigbee technology into forward 
collision waring system (FCWS).  FCWS uses lasers, sensors, 
cameras for scanning the road ahead and alerting the driver if 
the distance to a vehicle ahead is closing too quickly. Sourabh 
Pawade et al. [40] proposed a Zigbee based advanced driver 
assistance systems. This system has two units: (i) mobile unit 
where Zigbee technology was installed (ii) static unit on the 
road. Mobile unit helps to alert the driver along with audio 
warnings. Sourabh Pawade et al. also designed a drink and 
drive prevention system for continuous monitoring the 
alcohol level of the driver in order to reduce the accidents 
[40].    
1) Threats  
There are mainly four concepts of Zigbee based security [41].   
a) High level of security   
b) Trust center 
c) AES and DES 
d) Message Integrity code   
N. Vidgren et. Al [41] proposed two types of attacks that can 
harm the ZigBee security. They are:  
(i) Sabotage attack: It is based on sabotaging the zigbee end 
devices when it sends a special signal. The signal makes the 
devices wake-up constantly until the battery runs out.   
(ii) Network Key Sniffing attack: This attack occurs when 
key exchange system is utilized in ZigBee at the time of using 
standard security level. The security level can be defined by 
the ZigBee specification for the purpose of interrupting the 
network key.  
Olayemi Olawumi [42] proposed three practical attacks 
against the ZigBee security.  
(i) Network discovery and device identification attack  
(ii) Interception of packets attack   
(iii) Replay attack.   
Figure 7 illustrates the process of Replay attack.  
 
Figure 7. Process of Replay attack (Adapted from [74]) 
 
2) Countermeasures  
Cache et al. [43] presented that the best countermeasure 
against the attack is to recognize the effect of this attack. The 
attack should be evaluated in own networks for recognizing 
the information which is visible to the attacker.   
Olawumi et al. [42] suggested the use of intrusion detection, 
the installation of network keys before deployment, and the 
incorporation of time-stamping within ZigBee’s encryption 
methods to combat replay attacks.  
(i) Against interception of packets attack: Standard security 
level was proposed in [42]. As a result, administrator will 
get highest level of security.  
(ii) Against Replay attack:  Fusion of time stamping 
mechanism with the AES was proposed in order to 
mitigate the replay attack [42].  
E. Bluetooth  
Bluetooth is a type wireless system. This technology is used 
for exchanging files and messages between fixed and mobile 
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devices. The range of communication of this device is short. 
Bluetooth uses short-wavelength UHF radio waves. The 
frequency range is 2.40-2.48 GHz. [44]. Some best cars that 
have good Bluetooth facility are as follows, Chevrolet 
Corvette, Mercedes-Benz E-Class, Ram 1500, Toyota Camry, 
etc. Bluetooth Version 5.2 was released on January 2020. Low 
energy audio, low energy isochronous channel, low energy 
power control are the salient features of version 5.2.  
1) Threats  
Several research paper focused on Bluetooth vulnerabilities. 
According to H. Onishi [45], there are some necessary 
vulnerabilities faced in the Bluetooth:  
(i) Security technique is limited.  
(ii) Permission of user is not required at the time of pairing 
the devices.  
(iii) Virus or malware in carry-in devices can destroy the 
security system.  
(iv) After pairing, necessary data such as password, address 
book can be achieved.  
(v) Probability of buffer overflow attack. In buffer overflow, 
the attacker can overwrite the memory of an application. 
System can be crashed due to this attack.  
(vi) Malicious GNSS signals. GNSS means global 
navigation satellite system. GNSS has 2 types of 
vulnerability:  
(a) jamming (b) location spoofing   
M. Cheah et. al. [46] classified Bluetooth attacks in his paper. 
Table 1 illustrates various type of Bluetooth attacks.   
Attacks Threats 
Range Extension Extension of range by external 
directional antenna 
Fuzzing Inoculation of malicious data 
Sniffing Narrow band and wideband 
receiver is used for dumping 
raw data 
DoS Flooding with many signals that 
results jamming 
Malware Malicious codes or programs 
injected via interface 
Unauthorized access of 
data 
Brute forcing PINs, unprotected 
execution of APIs, utilizing 
loopholes in the OBEX 
protocols. 
Man in the middle attack Entering anyone in the middle 
of a V2V communication in 
order to eavesdrop on or modify 
data 
Table 1. Attacks in Bluetooth 
2) Countermeasures  
H. Onishi offered some technical methods in order to mitigate 
the Bluetooth vulnerabilities [45].    
(i)   Penetration testing for mainly V2V communication and 
interfaces of Bluetooth in order to identify threats.  
(ii) Allowance of certified carry-in devices with proper audit 
in order to connect to vehicles.   
(iii) Intrusion detection for detecting abnormal conditions and 
notifying the driver instantly.  
(iv) Availability of ISO-26262 used to define the functional 
hazards.  
F. Wi-Fi and WiMAX  
Wi-Fi means wireless fidelity.  Wi-Fi is a candidate for 
vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure 
communication. WiMAX is faster than Wi-Fi. WiMAX 
means Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
(WiMAX). WiMAX refers to IEEE 802.16 standard. WiMAX 
has several features such as low-latency, Quality of Service 
(QoS), good security, all-IP core network support [47, 48]. 
Wi-Fi and WiMAX system with the help of orthogonal 
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) [5,19, 25-28], 
multiple access version of OFDM known as OFDMA, MIMO 
technology can gain speeds in a unified platform for voice 
communication, video communication, V2V communication. 
The advantage of using OFDM makes WiMAX/WiFi to 
overcome the multipath fading effects and still obtain a high 
data rate [26-28]. Benefits from the channel of MIMO system 
[6] can be adopted by Wi-Fi and WiMAX in order to improve 
the wireless channel and to double the capacity without 
increasing the channel bandwidth and the required power of 
the transmitting antenna. As a result, the spectral efficiency 
can also be increased at an exponential rate.  MIMO system 
also can play an important role in vehicular communication. 
Massive MIMO is considered a key technology in 5G 
communication [49-51].  
1) Threats  
Vo-Huu et al. [52] examined the IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) 
standard, and found that its interleaver/ convolutional scheme 
leaves it vulnerable to jamming attacks. Nakhila and Zhou 
examined how Evil Twin attacks on Wi-Fi can be detected 
[53]. Scarfone et al. discussed some threats that hampers the 
WiMAX security. The threats are radio frequency jamming, 
radio frequency interference, DoS, replay, man-in-the-middle, 
and eavesdropping attacks [54]. Kolias et al. [55] provided an 
extensive listing of attacks targeting the WiMAX architecture.  
2) Countermeasures  
Vo-Huu et al. proposed incorporating random, encrypted 
interleaving in order to protect against Wi-Fi jamming attacks 
[52]. Scarfone et al. [54] described technical countermeasures 
for WiMAX’s threats such as Confidentiality and Integrity 
Protection, Authentication and Authorization, Client Device 
Security, and Patches, Upgrades, and Updates. Kolias et al. 
[55] also offered focusing security efforts on the first entry to 
the network, private key management, multicast/broadcast 
communications, and mesh mode traffic rerouting in order to 
solve the WiMAX’s vulnerabilities.   
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G. RFID  
RFID uses radio signals to identify objects. In a RFID system, 
an RFID reader is able to read or identify tags attached to 
objects. Apart from vehicle tracking, RFID is used for toll 
collection, vehicle performance monitoring and vehicle 
routing [56-58].   
1) Threats  
Cho et al. [59] identified the two main threats to RFID 
communication:   
i) privacy infringement   
ii) forgery.   
Cho et al. also identified potential attacks against RFID 
communication as Eavesdropping, Brute Force, Replay, and 
MITM attacks. Tyagi et al. [60] mentioned some attacks in 
VANET such as message spoofing, DoS attack, tracking the 
movement of the vehicle etc.  
2) Countermeasures 
 
Mohamed El Beqqal et al. [61] proposed some 
countermeasures in order to protect the personal data from the 
attacks and reduce the probability of tracking. Some 
protection methods mentioned in [61] are:  
a) Delegation Tree 
b) Tag Killing 
c) XOR Encryption 
d) Protocol based technique such as grouping proof 
protocol [62], multi-owner multi-tag transfer 
protocol [63], Randomized Skip Graphs-Based 
(RSG) RFID authentication [64] etc. 
Kazuya Sakai et. al. [65] proposed a mathematical model after 
investigating the weak privacy in the authentication system of 
RFID. The proposed model in [65] can identify the probability 
of two tags, which are linked with respect to the number of 
group keys. 
   
III. Direct Communication  
Modern day vehicles have a number of ports. These ports 
enable vehicles to connect to many external devices. In this 
way, drivers gain access to a number of services including 
maintenance information, on-board entertainment, and 
synchronization of mobile phones. In the case, an 
eavesdropper gets access to the vehicle ports, he/she can 
access the in-vehicle network and can attack the network, 
install virus or malware. In this section, the vulnerabilities of 
vehicle ports are discussed. For this, on-board diagnostics 
(OBD) II port, the universal serial bus (USB) port, and the 
vehicle charging ports are taken into consideration. 
Furthermore, the possible solutions to these attacks are also 
discussed.  
 
A. OBD-II Ports  
OBD means on board diagnostics. OBD-II is a type of 
computer that is capable of monitoring the speed, mileage and 
other necessary data. It is connected to the check engine light. 
This light illuminates at the time of detecting any problem of 
the system. On-board diagnostics can enable digital ingress to 
the public data. The data may be error codes or control 
message. On board diagnostics can also enable access to 
electronic control unit (ECU) settings that can help in order to 
mitigate theft protection and vehicle’s engine control [66, 67]. 
OBD generation with features are described in table 2.  
 
Generation Features Introducing 
Year 
1st 1) Electric faults detection 
2) Interface is manufacturer 
specific 
3) Only shows the check 
engine light message 
1994 
2nd 1) Interface is universal. 
2) Works without wire with 
the help of wi-fi or 
Bluetooth. 
3) High accuracy 
1996 
                          Table 2. OBD generation  
1)  In-Vehicle Network Access Attack  
Paul Carsten discussed some threats of in-vehicle networks in 
a study [68]. In [68], CAN protocol was considered as crucial 
attack vector where CAN means controller area network.  
CAN protocol can behave as a broadcast network. The 
important feature of CAN is efficient error-checking 
mechanisms. The mechanism can play an important role in 
order to confirm that packet errors at the time of transmission 
can be handled proficiently. According to the Carsten et. el. 
[68], the threats are:  
(i) Cannot able to identify CAN’s inability to identify the 
legitimate nodes.  
(ii) Packets do not carry sender address.  
(iii) Packets do not carry receiver address.  
(iv) No node authentication.   
Miller [44] used an ECOM cable and homemade connectors 
for transmitting and receiving messages over CAN.   
2) Countermeasures  
There are some solutions against the vulnerabilities.   
Schulze et al. [69] proposed data management system (DMS) 
for the purpose of monitoring communication as well as 
identification of malicious behavior. Ling [70] provided an 
algorithmic solution to DoS attack and error flag utilization of 
CAN protocol. According to Liu et al., OBD-II port should be 
separated from the in-vehicle network [23]. Oguma and his 
team proposed an approach using a method of attestation with 
encryption. This approach is able to identify the nodes existed 
at the startup of the system [71].   
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B. USB Port  
USB ports are very popular and these ports can connect 
phones, USB devices with entertainment files and navigation 
systems to the vehicle [72]. There are several types of USB 
ports: USB-A, USB-B, Mini USB. Micro USB, USB-C.    
1) Threats  
USB devices persist a target for cyber threats. According to 
the Kaspersky Lab data, 2017, it is showed that in every 12 
months around one in four users worldwide is affected by a 
‘local’ cyber incident. These attacks are caused by USB 
devices [46].  
2) Countermeasures  
According to Onishi [45] protection against USB threats is 
difficult because there is high amount of USB devices 
available in the market. Two solutions were proposed by 
Onishi:   
a) Connect USB initially to a website for receiving a security 
certificate. In this case, only USB devices with 
certification should be allowed to be used with a vehicle. 
b) Block propagation from a non-critical area to a safety 
critical area. In this case, even if a virus or malware gets 
access into a vehicle, it will have less opportunity to get 
into the safety critical portion of the vehicles. 
  
IV. Conclusion  
As part of ITS, VANETs can contribute to the traffic 
management, road safety and drivers’ comfort. In VANETs, 
the vehicles exchange traffic conditions, accident warnings, 
etc. information. Vehicle also communicate with 
infrastructures along the roads. Such communication facilities 
have introduced a number of security and privacy threats. In 
this review paper, the cyber security in VANET is discussed. 
Both remote and direct vehicle communication scenarios are 
taken into consideration. A number of threats such as radio 
frequency jamming, radio frequency interference, DoS, 
replay, man-in-the-middle, eavesdropping attacks, virus, 
malware, sniffing, fuzzing, privacy infringement, forgery are 
discussed. Possible safety measures are also described in this 
paper. In future, more security frameworks have to be 
designed to ensure attack-free vehicle communication 
systems. 
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